This last point is key, because the lesson from this exercise is that the Ukrainian participants employed tactics adapted for the modern, drone-saturated battlefield, while NATO forces have not been forced by the realities of war to do the same.

These reported results have been widely cited as evidence that drones now dominate the modern battlespace. A short internet search quickly turns up comments where analysts frequently claim that drones account for a majority of casualties in the Ukraine war, and recent British defense reviews have described drones as an essential component of land warfare. Ukrainian officials have echoed this assessment, emphasizing the transformative impact of battlefield technologies, and have expressed a willingness to share their experience with NATO partners.

However, these conclusions, although valid, warrant caution. Drones generate significant tactical effects, but tactical success must be considered as part of the tactics/operations/strategy hierarchy. Recall that tactical success does not equate to strategic transformation. To borrow William Shakespeare’s phrase, it might be fair to say that drones offer “more light than heat.”

Their main achievement on the battlefield has been to greatly restrict the mobility of both sides. In this respect, drones resemble submarines or antitank weapons: They may be effective at denying portions of the battlespace, but are incapable of controlling it. And like submarines and antitank weapons, drones operate within established military theory. They operate within existing paradigms rather than breaking them. Therefore, as argued in our book Not Dead: A Case for Tanks in the Modern Battlespace, they should be understood as an evolutionary, not revolutionary, development and their employment considered within the broader context of combined arms theory and practice.